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Sharing Very High Risks
How Government Can Make Health Insurance 
Markets More Efficient and More Accessible
Katherine Swartz
Harvard School of Public Health
Between 40 and 44 million Americans—one in six nonelderly—do
not have any form of health insurance, according to the 2001 Census.
Why they do not have health insurance involves a variety of reasons,
many of which are often present in any particular person who lacks
coverage. We can make two generalizations, however. First, a majority
simply cannot afford to purchase health insurance unless it is heavily
subsidized, which currently means subsidized by an employer that
sponsors group coverage. About two-thirds of the uninsured have fam-
ily incomes below $35,000, which is generally too low to be able to
afford health insurance unless an employer pays a large share of the
group premium. The second generalization is that health insurance
markets, especially the small group and individual (nongroup) markets,
are subject to market failure. The market failure is caused by insurers’
fear of adverse selection. Carriers know from experience that people
who know or suspect they will have expensive health care needs in the
coming year are also more likely to apply for insurance coverage than
people who do not expect such expenses. Such people make up a dis-
proportionate fraction of the people who apply for coverage every year.
As a result, insurers are especially likely to either refuse to insure an
applicant or set a high premium for anyone who they perceive to be
likely to incur higher medical expenditures. People who fall into this
category are generally over the age of 45, female, working in particular
types of occupations, and have had medical problems in the past. For
these people, health insurance is also either unaffordable—given the
high premiums relative to their incomes—or simply unavailable.
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Both of these explanations of why people lack health insurance
provide rationales for government taking a role in health insurance.
Medicaid and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP)
were created largely to deal with the fact that low-income people can-
not afford to purchase health insurance at existing prices. Current
efforts to incrementally expand eligibility for Medicaid and new, subsi-
dized buy-in programs are similarly grounded in the tradition that we
use government to redistribute resources in our society to make sure
that low-income or otherwise deserving people receive goods and ser-
vices deemed necessities.
When markets break down in the absence of full information (as
with adverse selection), economic theory argues for government to
intervene to counter the problem with the objective of making the mar-
ket competitive and thereby efficient.1 In this chapter, I develop the
idea that in the case of health insurance markets, government interven-
tion in the form of being responsible for the very highest-cost individu-
als every year would reduce insurers’ fear of adverse selection. In turn,
this would reduce inefficiency caused by insurers spending enormous
effort to predict whether or not an individual will be likely to have high
medical costs, and premiums ought to be lower as a result. In addition,
if insurers do not need to bear the risks of very high-cost people
because such risks have been shifted to government—and society at
large—then accessibility to health insurance should be greater.
The plan of the chapter is as follows. In the next section, I briefly
describe who lacks health insurance in the United States. In the third
section, I describe how health insurance markets work and how insur-
ers compete in the individual, nongroup market. In the fourth section, I
discuss the proposal to have government shift the risk of very high-cost
people from insurers to the general population and how it could
increase efficiency and accessibility in individual and small group
insurance markets. I also provide some examples of government taking
the role of reinsurer and “backstopper” of markets so that they func-
tion. Finally, I offer some concluding comments.
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WHO DOES NOT HAVE HEALTH INSURANCE?
The uninsured are a cross section of Americans—children, young
adults, and middle-aged people who generally work full time but do
not earn more than $30,000 per year (in part because they have no
more than a high school diploma and do not have specific skills).
Because they have low incomes and no health insurance, they fre-
quently cannot afford their share of health insurance premiums when
an employer does sponsor coverage and have debts for emergency
medical care that they are working to pay down. Some of the adults are
widowed or divorced, with young children, so the income they earn
does not enable them to pay for nongroup health insurance. Many unin-
sured adults are self-employed or working in small, family-run busi-
nesses that cannot afford to sponsor health insurance. About 9.2
million of the uninsured are children, and perhaps as many as 3 million
of these children are eligible for Medicaid or the SCHIPs. However,
parents either do not realize their children are eligible for the programs
or they find the process of applying for public coverage “unpleasant”
(Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured 2000a). A major-
ity of uninsured are white, but African Americans and Hispanics com-
prise a disproportionate share of the uninsured.
The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation’s Commission on Medic-
aid and the Uninsured has conducted lengthy interviews with seven
families and one 52-year-old grandmother (Kaiser Commission on
Medicaid and the Uninsured 2000b). Two common threads run
throughout their stories. One, the adults work hard but do not earn high
incomes, so even when they have the option of obtaining health insur-
ance through an employer, they feel that they cannot afford the
employee share of the premium. Second, all of the uninsured families
have incurred medical debts as a result of being uninsured. The debts
are for very treatable medical problems that would not cause an insured
person to think twice about seeing a physician or going to the emer-
gency room with a sick child. But the uninsured bills for such care—
running between $1,000 and $6,000—leave the uninsured families
both strapped for cash to pay for health insurance and in daily fear of
further medical bills.
106 Swartz
When we examine demographic and socioeconomic characteristics
of the uninsured, the multidimensional stories of real people are often
overshadowed. Nonetheless, knowing more about the distributions of
characteristics of the uninsured helps when developing public policies
to increase access to health insurance. I will draw upon the March 1999
Current Population Survey (CPS) for most of what follows. The March
1999 CPS showed that there were almost 44 million nonelderly Ameri-
cans without any form of health insurance. According to the March
2001 CPS, the number of uninsured declined to about 38.4 million,
largely as a result of the booming economy and small increases in the
number of people with employer-sponsored coverage. However, the
mild recession in 2001 through early 2002, combined with the increase
in unemployment, has most analysts believing that the number of unin-
sured in early 2003 will be closer to the number in 1999, so I will use
1999 data. 
Age
The uninsured are generally young—64 percent are younger than
35—making them relatively inexpensive in terms of expected medical
care use (Table 5.1). A quarter of the uninsured are children under the
age of 18. The 11 million uninsured children account for 15.4 percent
of all children. Two decades ago, about a third of the uninsured were
children, and close to 20 percent of all children were uninsured, so the
decline in the number of uninsured children is a reflection of the
impact of the expanded Medicaid eligibility criteria for children.
Young adults (18–24) and adults between 25 and 34 have much higher
chances of being uninsured—30 percent of young adults and 24 per-
cent of 25–34-year-olds lack coverage.
Income
Just over half of the uninsured in 1999 had family incomes in the
previous year of under $25,000 (Figure 5.1). (For comparison, in 1999
the median household income for all Americans was $42,100.)
Another 15 percent had family incomes between $25,000 and $35,000.
Thus, two-thirds of the uninsured in 1999 had incomes below $35,000.
Another way of looking at family income is to adjust it for family size
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Table 5.1 Uninsured by Age Cohort, 1999
Figure 5.1 Income Distribution of Nonelderly Uninsured, 1999
SOURCE: March 1999 CPS.
Age cohort Number % of uninsured % of age cohort
< 18    11.073 25.0 15.4
18–24  7.776 17.6 30.0
25–34   9.127 20.6 23.7
35–44   7.708 17.4 17.2
45–64   8.239 18.6 14.2
65 + 0.358 0.8 1.1
Total 44.281 100.0 16.3




























and compute it relative to the poverty level by family size. In data not
shown here, two-thirds of the uninsured had incomes below 250 per-
cent of the poverty level. These incomes are simply too low for people
to afford to purchase health insurance unless it is heavily subsidized by
an employer that sponsors group coverage. The 21 percent of the unin-
sured who have family incomes above $50,000 reflects two changes in
the uninsured over the 1990s. One is the growing economy and tight
labor market by the end of the 1990s. This caused many people with
part-time or part-year jobs (that do not include health insurance as part
of the compensation) to work more hours per week and/or more weeks
during the year, enabling them to earn incomes above $50,000. This
was especially true in two-earner families where each adult might have
earned less than $20,000 in weaker economic times. A second factor
that explains some of the uninsured with incomes above $50,000 is that
a little more than half of these people live with family members who
are not part of their “nuclear” or insurance family unit. That is, they
live with parents, grown children, or siblings, and because they are all
relatives, their “family” income is higher than it would be for an insur-
ance definition of family. Nonetheless, it is worrisome that an increas-
ing number of uninsured people have family incomes that we think of
as solidly in the middle-class section of the income distribution. We do
not know how much of this growth reflects people being offered health
insurance where they work but declining it for themselves or their
dependents because they cannot afford the employee share of the pre-
mium.
Labor Force Status of Adults
More than two-thirds of uninsured adults are in the labor force,
with 60 percent of uninsured adults working and another 8 percent
unemployed and looking for work. When we count all the dependents
of working uninsured adults, a little more than four out of five unin-
sured live with someone who works (71 percent live with someone
who works full time and 12 percent live with someone who works part
time, according to the Urban Institute’s analysis of CPS data for the
Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured 2000c). 
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Health Status
The uninsured are in relatively good health, with only 7 percent
saying they are in “fair” health and another 2 percent saying they are in
“poor” health. One reason more of the uninsured are not in poor health
is that some of the population in poor health qualify for Medicaid or
Medicare (the latter by virtue of long-term disability). Moreover, the
vast majority of young people and people who work generally do not
have serious medical conditions. The vignettes of the uninsured col-
lected by the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured
showed people who were not in poor health in spite of the fact that they
often had medical debts of $1,000 or more. The medical bills were for
treatable medical episodes that occurred in emergency rooms because
the people were uninsured (e.g., strep throat, childhood asthma
attacks), or events such as unexpected caesarian section deliveries. 
Basic Policy Dilemma
This picture of the uninsured illuminates a basic policy dilemma.
On the one hand, health insurance coverage in the United States is
based on employer-sponsored coverage, and we assume that working
people will obtain insurance through an employer group. Employer
competition for high-skill labor has forced compensation for high-skill
jobs to include higher wages and fringe benefits, including health
insurance. On the other hand, we have an economy where many jobs
do not require higher education and/or special skills. Such jobs gener-
ally have low wages and no health insurance. (Although low-skill jobs
in large firms are more likely to provide health insurance as a fringe
benefit, in 1999 a quarter of all uninsured adults worked for firms with
more than 500 employees.) 
The fact that the labor market for low-skill workers is not tight
enough to cause employers to offer health insurance for low-skill jobs
is a large part of the explanation for why 60 percent of the uninsured
adults are working but uninsured. Most uninsured adults do not have
more than a high school education and are not skilled enough to be in
high-skill jobs. This problem is further compounded by the fact that
almost half of the uninsured workers are employed by firms that have
fewer than 25 employees. 
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As I discuss below, small firms face much higher per person pre-
miums than do large firms, which have much larger numbers of people
for pooling risks of medical expenditures. Because small firms gener-
ally have small profit margins, they cannot afford to increase the com-
pensation of low-skill workers with the relatively high cost health
insurance available to them.
Thus, unless we want to radically alter the labor market for low-
skill workers and the economic conditions in which small firms oper-
ate, we need to develop two concurrent policies to expand health insur-
ance coverage. One policy would provide heavily subsidized quasi-
public coverage to people with incomes below some level, such as 250
percent of the poverty level, or $35,000. The second would increase
access to private health insurers for higher-income uninsured individu-
als by reducing the risk to insurers of covering people who do not have
employer-sponsored coverage. Developing such a policy would pro-
vide a way for private insurers to continue to be the primary source of
health insurance in the United States and cover more of the uninsured.
To see why requires an understanding of how insurers view the unin-
sured and how they compete for business, the subject that we turn to
next.
HOW HEALTH INSURANCE COMPANIES COMPETE
To understand the health insurance markets in the United States,
we start with the fact that the majority of people obtain coverage
through employers. Approximately 63 percent of the population (of all
ages) have employer-sponsored group coverage.2 Those with
employer-sponsored coverage pool their individual risks of high medi-
cal care costs. Almost everyone in large employer groups participates
in the employer-sponsored health insurance, so there is only a small
proportion of each group who are likely to have unexpectedly high
medical expenses. But people who do not have access to such pooling
of risks—the uninsured and the people who obtain individual cover-
age—face insurance markets in which adverse selection is a major
problem.
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Three Interconnected Health Insurance Markets
Health insurance is sold in the United States in several intercon-
nected markets. We can loosely distinguish between large employer
group, small group, and individual (or nongroup) insurance markets.
Some indemnity insurers and managed care plans (hereafter referred to
collectively as carriers) actively sell coverage in all three markets, but
most do not. More often, we observe large carriers selling coverage to
large employer groups, and smaller carriers selling in the small group
and individual markets. In addition to these three types of markets,
every state regulates how insurance is sold within its borders. The
states have different regulations governing facets of insurance ranging
from what benefits must be covered by insurance policies to how rates
are determined to requirements about financial reserves. As a result,
there are 51 different submarkets within each of the three distinct mar-
kets. Many carriers, particularly smaller carriers, offer policies only in
those states with similar regulations so they do not have to keep track
of and respond to many regulatory changes. 
One result of this is that in the individual markets in 1997, the
number of carriers selling individual policies ranged from only two or
three (in Delaware, Idaho, and Alaska) to more than 40 (in New York
and Texas) (Chollet, Kirk, and Chow 2000). New York’s relatively
large number of carriers selling individual coverage is due to the
requirement that all HMOs sell individual coverage. In 1997, just
under 700 carriers sold individual policies in the United States; by
comparison, 2,450 carriers sold policies in the large and small group
markets (Chollet, Kirk, and Chow 2000). In spite of this difference, the
individual and group markets are characterized by a small number of
carriers having at least half of the total number of policies sold in each
type of market in each state (Chollet, Kirk, and Chow 2000).
Large employers have avoided state regulations and state taxes on
health insurance by self-insuring (or self-financing) their employees’
health care costs. The Employees Retirement and Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA) exempts self-insured employers from state regula-
tions and taxes on policies sold within a state. Most self-insured
employers pay a fee to a third-party administrator (almost always a car-
rier) to administer the claims from medical care providers, and the
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employees are usually unaware that the third-party administrator is not
their insurer as well. 
Health coverage is sold and priced quite differently in the three
types of health insurance markets (ignoring for the moment the 50 dif-
ferent jurisdictions’ regulations). The selling practices and pricing dif-
ferences largely reflect the extent to which carriers fear adverse
selection in each of the markets. In the large group market, adverse
selection at the group level is uncommon since almost all employees in
a large company generally enroll for coverage. If an employer offers a
choice of plans, then carriers may be concerned about adverse selection
if they are the choice of a small proportion of the group (Buchmueller
and Feldstein 1997; Cutler and Reber 1998). Employees and their
dependents in large groups pay average premiums based on the total
expected costs of the group; a particular person’s expected medical
care costs are not factored into the premium he or she pays. Usually,
the employer also negotiates with several carriers as to the out-of-
pocket cost sharing and benefits covered, and trade-offs between these
and the premiums.
Small groups (typically, groups with less than 50 employees) and
individuals face very different markets. Per policy premiums are sub-
stantially higher in these markets than in the large group market; it is
not unusual to find premiums for single or family policies to be more
than twice as expensive for small groups or individuals than for large
groups. The primary reason for these higher premiums is that pooling
of risks occurs over much smaller groups of people in the small group
and individual markets. As a result, the variance on the expected costs
is much larger. This creates a greater risk that actual costs will exceed
expected costs by a wide margin. Carriers respond to this in two ways.
First, they set higher premiums for small group and individual policies
because the risk per policy is higher and they need to be compensated
for bearing greater risk. Second, they try to insure only people who
they expect will have lower medical costs and to avoid insuring people
who they perceive to be high-cost users of medical care. Carriers go to
great expense to selectively insure people who they perceive to have
low risks of high medical care costs. The costs of the risk-selection
mechanisms used by carriers are a large component of the higher pre-
miums for small group and individual policies. 
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Information Asymmetry Shapes the Form of Competition 
between Carriers
Carriers cannot discern from applicant information whether an
applicant will have high medical care use in the coming year. But they
believe that people who apply for insurance coverage are dispropor-
tionately comprised of people who expect to have high medical care
use in the near future—perhaps because they or a close relative had a
medical condition in the past. The problem for carriers is that they usu-
ally cannot obtain this information; there is an asymmetry of informa-
tion between what the carriers know and what the insurance applicants
know. When there is asymmetric information in a market, the market
cannot be competitive and inefficiency will result. In the case of health
insurance markets, the carriers have the disadvantage in terms of the
asymmetry of information.
Carriers’ fear of adverse selection among applicants in the small
group and individual markets motivates their behaviors. Carriers fear
adverse selection because it causes them to underestimate premium
revenues needed for expenditures and thus risk substantial financial
losses. To avoid adverse selection, many carriers adopt selection mech-
anisms to screen out applicants whom they suspect will use expensive
medical care (Swartz and Garnick 1999, 2000a,b; Chollet and Kirk
1998). Such mechanisms include medical underwriting practices,3
refusing to issue or renew a policy, excluding coverage of services for
preexisting medical conditions, and differentiating their policies from
their competitors’ by generously covering some types of services (e.g.,
preventative) but limiting coverage of other services (e.g., substance
abuse treatment) (Stone 1993; Frank et al. 1997).4
Thus, competition in insurance markets, especially the small group
and individual markets, focuses on how well carriers use mechanisms
to identify which firms or individuals might be high-risk versus low-
risk. As Newhouse pointed out in the context of risk adjustment mod-
els, a carrier only needs to be a little better than its competitors in the
use of selection mechanisms to make more of a profit (Newhouse
1994). When carriers are not constrained in their ability to set different
premiums for people who they believe have different probabilities of
using expensive medical care, then carriers compete in large part in
terms of the accuracy of their models for predicting a person’s (or
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firm’s) medical expenses. These models are generally known as actuar-
ial models because they are based on actuarial tables of likelihoods of
using different amounts of medical care by many different demo-
graphic and socioeconomic characteristics as well as health status and
prior use of health care.5 Different carriers will then price their health
insurance policies to people and small firms based on the individual’s
or firm’s expenditures predicted by each carrier’s actuarial model. Usu-
ally, the models are used to determine how the premiums might be
underwritten for particular individuals or firms. That is, if a small firm
is predicted to have a high risk of high medical expenses in the next
year because several people in the group had high expenses in the last
year, the carrier may agree to offer insurance only if the firm pays a
substantially higher premium. The additional premium amount under-
writes the basic premium for the policy. 
Underwriting principles might also cause a carrier to deny cover-
age completely or exclude coverage for a condition to a group or per-
son on the basis of information known by the carrier. Most states allow
exclusion of coverage for a preexisting condition (such as cancer,
osteoarthritis, or allergies) for a limited time period—typically 12
months. As a result, carriers more often simply deny an application if a
person has had quite serious conditions, such as angina or a myocardial
infarction (Chollet and Kirk 1998). In some states, underwriting of pre-
miums is not permitted because it is viewed as a selection mechanism
that discriminates against people if they are perceived to have high
risks of expensive medical care. When underwriting is not permitted or
its use is restricted, carriers turn to other selection mechanisms to avoid
insuring high-risk people. 
A frequently used mechanism for separating high- and low-risk
applicants consists of differentiating the benefits (or medical services)
covered by a policy. If a carrier is able to identify a health care benefit
that is particularly attractive to low-risk people but not high-risk peo-
ple, then it can design policies that cause people to voluntarily reveal
that they are likely to be low- or high-risk people. Carriers’ use of dif-
ferences in benefits packages is a mechanism for getting individuals
(or groups) to reveal information that separates them in terms of risk
levels for nominally unpredictable expensive medical events. Thus, for
example, if a person knows that cancer runs in his or her family—
which the carriers do not know—the person might choose a policy that
Sharing Very High Risks 115
has high upper limits on covered expenses, provides for cancer screen-
ing tests, and includes first-rate cancer centers in the list of providers.
By choosing such a policy, the person is revealing information to the
carrier regarding his or her risk expectations. Carriers have invested in
substantial efforts to understand how differences in benefits packages
can be used to attract low-risk people to some policies and high-risk
people to other policies. 
Carriers also have developed monopolistic market niches in the
small group and individual markets as another mechanism for avoiding
adverse selection (Swartz and Garnick 2000a,b). In the individual mar-
kets, for example, some carriers specialize in marketing to individuals
who have left the armed services; others specialize in policies attrac-
tive to very small firms of professionals (e.g., lawyers or financial
advisors) or only to individuals who are self-employed. As a result,
few carriers in a state market actively compete for business among all
consumers seeking individual policies, and people whom insurers per-
ceive as high-risk have few, if any, options for obtaining health insur-
ance (Pollitz, Sorian, and Thomas 2001; GAO 1996).
The differences in states’ regulations of the insurance markets
within their borders permit the greater or lesser use of these mecha-
nisms or different combinations of the strategies to avoid insuring
high-risk people. States that have attempted to block carriers’ use of
such preferential selection mechanisms, particularly in the small group
or individual markets, have almost always set up regulations that block
the use of only one or two of these mechanisms. State regulations, for
example, might mandate that all policies sold in the state must cover
substance abuse treatment so as to inhibit carriers’ ability to avoid
high-risk people who may want coverage of care for substance abuse.
Some states have enacted regulations requiring carriers to accept any
applicant (“guaranteed issue”) so a carrier cannot turn down an appli-
cant it views as high-risk.6 Of course, if a state has only one or two of
these regulations in place, the carriers can use other mechanisms that
are not proscribed to accomplish the same objective. A common exam-
ple is when a state requires carriers to accept any applicant but does not
also have a regulation governing the way in which premiums can be
set, we observe what should be a totally expected outcome: high-risk
people are indeed offered coverage but at an extraordinarily high pre-
mium. Similarly, when states require community rating of premiums
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(say, in the small group insurance market) but do not standardize the
benefits to be covered in policies sold in the market, carriers can use
differences in what benefits are covered under different policies to try
to separate high-risk firms from low-risk firms.
In summation, the information asymmetries in health insurance
markets cause the markets, particularly the small group and individual
markets, to be inefficient. Inefficiency reflects the fact that enormous
efforts and expense are spent in developing and applying selection
mechanisms to avoid covering people who are likely to use expensive
medical care. Carriers compete with each other not in terms of produc-
ing insurance per se at the lowest possible cost, but in terms of insuring
as high a proportion of low-risk people as possible in order to keep
costs low. Thus, the usual competitive market forces that cause produc-
ers to seek profits by reducing their costs of production and increasing
market share have been altered by the fear of adverse selection in
insurance markets. In insurance, carriers seek to minimize their risk of
unexpected high costs by competing to have very high shares of low-
risk people among the people they insure. The competition among car-
riers consists of trying to do better than other carriers at selecting low-
risk people, which involves efforts that do not contribute to producing
insurance. The costs of creating and using selection mechanisms are a
measure of the inefficiency that exists in health insurance markets. 
A ROLE FOR GOVERNMENT: COVER VERY HIGH-COST 
PEOPLE EVERY YEAR
The market failure caused by carriers’ fear of adverse selection
leaves us with two outcomes. One is that risk selection activities cause
premiums to be substantially higher in the small group and individual
market than in the large group market, making health insurance rela-
tively unaffordable for most people who do not have access to
employer-sponsored coverage. The second outcome is that a substan-
tial number of people do not have access to health insurance, especially
in the individual market, because they have some characteristic that
causes a carrier to perceive them as high-risk.
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The inefficiency due to expenditures on risk selection could be
substantially reduced if government were to shift responsibility from
the carriers to the general population for the costs of people who, each
year, have very high costs—that is, people who have health care costs
in the top 1–3 percent of the distribution of medical expenditures. Cur-
rently, if a carrier has enrollees with unexpectedly high costs, those
costs are borne by the other people insured by the carrier and whatever
stockholders the carrier may have. If the carrier has to substantially
increase premiums to recover from losses due to unexpectedly high
costs of some enrollees, there is a high probability that some number of
enrollees who have low costs will leave the carrier in response to the
premium increase. This leaves the carrier with a risk pool that has a
higher average expected cost. If the following year there are again
unexpectedly high costs, the cycle will repeat itself; if it continues, we
have what the insurance industry calls a “death spiral,” where the par-
ticular policy has to be closed down and abandoned or the carrier is
forced out of business. This outcome places all the burden of insuring
high-cost people on the individuals who have had health insurance
from the carrier—and who have to pay higher premiums or drop their
coverage —and the shareholders of the carrier.
If the costs of very high-cost people were shifted instead to the
government—and thus to the entire population—carriers’ fears of
adverse selection and a death spiral would be substantially reduced.
The burden of such costs would be redistributed from the carriers that
encountered adverse selection. As a result, carriers would no longer
have an incentive to use and develop risk selection mechanisms, and
the inefficiency present in the small group and individual insurance
markets would be greatly reduced. This would also enable people to
purchase health insurance policies rather than being denied coverage.
What I am suggesting is that government—most likely the federal
government, but it could be state governments—take on the role of
reinsurer for carriers that have insured people who have very high
medical bills in a year. That is, the government could pay a portion of
the costs of those individuals whose total annual medical costs exceed
some threshold—say, $30,000—or an amount that places a person’s
medical expenditures above the 98th or 99th percentile of the distribu-
tion of medical expenses of the entire population. Carriers often pur-
chase reinsurance to protect themselves from the risk that an insured’s
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claims will exceed $50,000. Instead, if the government acted as the
reinsurer for the high-cost claims, the carriers would then have far less
incentive to avoid insuring people they expect to have high expendi-
tures.
Examining the distribution of medical expenditures for the U.S.
population shows why this proposal would greatly reduce carriers’
incentives to use selection mechanisms. According to preliminary esti-
mates from the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, Monheit pre-
dicts that 68 percent of the population had medical expenditures below
$1,000.7 He further estimates that 4.5 percent of the population had
expenditures between $5,000 and $9,999, while just 4 percent of the
population had expenditures above $10,000. It is very difficult to pre-
dict who will have expenditures between $5,000 and $10,000 per year.
But so long as a carrier is not responsible for costs of people with
expenditures above, say, $30,000, then it is not worth the expense for a
carrier to use risk selection methods to avoid people with expenditures
in the 90th to 96th or 98th percentile of the expenditures distribution. It
is simply too difficult to distinguish between people who will have
expenditures at the 30th percentile and those who will be in the 5–10
percentiles below the threshold for reinsurance. Moreover, while there
is some correlation between a person’s medical expenditures from one
year to the next, that correlation falls away when a longer period of
time is considered (McCall and Wai 1983; Welch 1985; Goodman et
al. 1991; Gornick, McMillan, and Lubitz 1993). Thus, we should
expect that different people each year would have very high medical
expenditures that would qualify for the government reinsurance.
Reinsurance almost always requires the original insurer (the car-
rier) to bear some portion of the costs above the threshold where rein-
surance picks up insuring events. This cost-sharing is built into the
reinsurance structure so the original carrier will retain an incentive to
manage the health care of high-cost people. It would be important to
maintain this incentive if the government were to reinsure the very
high medical care expenses. In addition, for any person who has health
care expenditures over the reinsurance threshold level each year, the
government could cover either a portion of the costs above the thresh-
old or a portion of all of the person’s costs. In either case, the share of
costs that the government would cover also could vary over different
levels of expenditures. For example, the government could cover 90
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percent of the costs above the eligibility threshold up to two times the
threshold, 80 percent of the costs from two times the threshold up to
three times the threshold, and then 100 percent of the costs above that. 
Having government take on the role of reinsurer would make the
small group and individual insurance markets function more effi-
ciently. This would immediately provide what economists call a “wel-
fare” gain to everyone who purchases health insurance in the small
group or individual insurance markets, since the premiums for insur-
ance will decline in proportion to the reduction in use of selection
mechanisms. Moreover, high-risk people who currently cannot obtain
coverage from all carriers also would benefit because carriers would no
longer deem them undesirable. High-risk people would have greater
access to carriers and policies in insurance markets.
The welfare gains caused by the increased efficiency in the insur-
ance markets are not “free,” of course. This requires government reve-
nues to pay all or some of the medical care costs of the designated
high-cost people. A political advantage of using the income tax and
sources of revenues for the general revenue funds is that they do not
require implementation of a new tax to pay for either a new insurance
program for high-cost people or a reinsurance fund to pay carriers for
high-cost claims. On the other hand, when a program is competing for
general revenue funds along with high-visibility government pro-
grams—such as education, highway maintenance and construction, or
homeland security—then it is vulnerable to pressures to cut the budget.
This is particularly true for programs that benefit everyone, but may
appear to assist only a small number of people—in this case, those
individuals with high-cost claims. The argument has to be made that
both of the government options for high-cost individuals increase the
efficiency of insurance markets, thereby providing benefits to every-
one.
Implementing an institutional structure to permit the government
to take responsibility for the health care expenses of the very high-cost
individuals also would require some standardization of health policies
sold in the small group and individual markets. Standardizing the bene-
fits covered by policies would make it possible to compare medical
expenditure patterns of people and then to identify those people who
have the very highest medical expenses. Without such standardization,
it would be quite difficult to know whether a person had high expendi-
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tures because of a very generous insurance policy as opposed to being
quite ill.
New York State created a subsidized health insurance program for
low-income individuals and small firms with low-wage workers that is
very close to my proposed plan. “Healthy New York” was developed
during 2000 and began enrolling individuals in February 2001. Under
Healthy New York, the state pays as much as 90 percent of the costs of
claims between $30,000 and $100,000 for people who have claims in a
calendar year that exceed $30,000 (Swartz 2001). The money for the
pool of funds that pay for these costs comes from the state’s tobacco
settlement funds. To ensure transparency of why people have high-cost
claims, currently there is only one standardized benefits package for
the Healthy New York policies. Premiums under Healthy New York for
eligible low-income individuals are about 50 percent less than the pre-
miums for individual coverage in the regular individual market; for
small firms the premiums are about 15–30 percent below premiums for
comparable policies in the small group market. 
In sum, if government were to redistribute the risk of very high
medical care costs from carriers to the broader population, efficiency
would be increased in the small group and individual insurance mar-
kets, enabling more people to obtain health insurance. Premiums
would be reduced because carriers would reduce their efforts to iden-
tify high-risk people whom they do not want to insure. As a result, rel-
atively low-risk people would be more likely to obtain and retain
coverage. Higher-risk people, who currently have great difficulty find-
ing carriers willing to insure them, would have more choice of policies
and carriers since there would be sharply reduced incentives for carri-
ers to avoid higher-risk enrollees. 
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
When risk is present in markets, such as health insurance markets,
market failure can be especially likely because of information asym-
metry and the potential for adverse selection. Risk also can cause mar-
kets to fail to form. If government acts to take care of or remove the
worst risks in such markets, the inefficiency in the markets would be
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greatly reduced, and markets that otherwise could not even start up
would be able to function.
There are precedents in other markets with risk where the federal
government has taken responsibility for the worst risks, thereby
enabling markets to function and grow. A market for reinsurance for
catastrophes has developed in the United States because there has been
a history (including, most recently, the response to the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001) of the federal government stepping in to pay
large fractions of the costs of catastrophes. Indeed, the creation of the
Federal Emergency Management Agency in 1978 formally acknowl-
edged the federal government’s role in assisting with recovery from
catastrophes. The secondary mortgage market in the United States,
which enables lenders of mortgage money to replenish their capital,
was established because the federal government has taken responsibil-
ity for the worst-risk mortgages since 1954. The Federal Housing
Authority (FHA) and the Veterans Administration (VA) shifted the
risk of default from mortgage lenders to the federal government for
people who otherwise would not have qualified for mortgage loans.
The FHA mortgage insurance and the VA mortgage guarantee program
set minimum standards for what properties were eligible for mortgages
and what types of financial information were needed from borrowers.
This standardization of information permitted mortgages to be resold
on a national basis because standardized information made it easier for
lending institutions that were not local to perform due diligence inves-
tigations of mortgages that were offered for resale in the secondary
mortgage market. In addition, very high-risk mortgages are backed by
federal guarantees. It is unlikely that either the reinsurance market or
the secondary mortgage market would function without the govern-
ment backstopping them by covering the worst risks. 
Similarly, if government were to reinsure the costs of those indi-
viduals with the highest medical expenditures each year, the risk of
very high costs would be shifted from carriers to the general popula-
tion. This would cause carriers in the small group and individual insur-
ance markets to spend substantially less on efforts to avoid insuring
people they perceive to be likely to have high costs. In turn, this would
reduce the rates for health insurance faced by people who purchase
insurance in these markets and enable a much larger set of people to
obtain health coverage.
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Having the government act as reinsurer, along with backstop carri-
ers in the individual and small group markets, will help about a third of
the people who currently are uninsured. The remaining uninsured do
not have sufficient incomes to afford health insurance unless it is
heavily subsidized. As we noted earlier, many of the low-income unin-
sured have medical debts for highly treatable episodes of care. Such
debts would be far lower if the people had obtained medical care in set-
tings other than hospital emergency departments. To facilitate the use
of more efficient settings for medical care by the low-income unin-
sured, government should either create more community health care
centers or extend eligibility to adults for public programs similar to the
SCHIPs. Such government moves also would increase efficiency in the
provision of health care to the very low-income uninsured.
Finally, the rising costs of medical care mean that health insurance
premiums will also increase, along with increased cost-sharing
required when people use medical care. If the past is any indication of
how this will affect people’s decisions to purchase insurance or take up
employer-sponsored coverage, the rising costs will lead to greater
numbers of uninsured as more people come to view health insurance as
unaffordable. As we have seen in the last decade, the uninsured are
increasingly people with lower middle-class incomes. We need to
rethink both how we provide and finance health insurance if we are to
avoid rising numbers of uninsured—such rethinking could begin with
the government taking on the role of reinsurer for small group and indi-
vidual health insurance markets. The government as reinsurer provides
a mechanism for public funds to enable private health insurance mar-
kets to operate efficiently and be accessible to more people.
Notes
The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation under Grant Number 033818. Opinions expressed are those of the author
and may not represent the opinions of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation or Har-
vard University.
1. In the case of public goods, the argument is that government should produce the
goods because a market cannot be sustained.
2. Based on estimates by the Census Bureau from the March 2001 Current Popula-
tion Survey. The estimates by type of coverage are not mutually exclusive because
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people can be covered by more than one type of health insurance during the year,
and in some cases at the same time (for example, some people have both Medi-
care and Medicaid coverage). See <www.census.gov/hhes/hlthins/hlthin01/
fig03.gif>.
3. Medical underwriting is the process by which carriers set the premium for an
applicant based on the person’s expected medical care costs. Thus, if a person has
poor health status, actuarial underwriting practices would yield a higher premium
than that for a similar person in excellent health. The underwriting process essen-
tially determines whether a person pays an additional amount plus the base pre-
mium for the policy.
4. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) has
been sometimes mistakenly assumed to restrict these selection practices in the
individual insurance market. HIPAA does not prohibit carriers from applying
selection practices to the great majority of individuals who seek coverage in the
individual insurance markets. See Nichols and Blumberg (1998) for details.
5. Applicants in both the small group and individual markets generally have to
respond to questionnaires about their health status, use of medications and medi-
cal care in the past, and health risk behaviors. It is not unheard of for small groups
to be offered coverage for most but not all of the members of the group, with the
rejected members being denied coverage because carriers believe they will have
high medical expenditures.
6. For example, Washington State, New York, and New Jersey’s individual insur-
ance markets are required to guarantee issue of policies to any applicant regard-
less of the applicant’s health status, age, gender, or place of residence.
7. Communication between Alan Monheit and the author, Spring 2001. Monheit and
Marc Berk have analyzed the distribution and concentration of the population’s
medical expenditures. See, for example, Berk and Monheit (2001).
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